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One row per model parameter: the value the simulations actually use, the
source as verified in the research vault (tonify-research, 1,152 notes), the
vault note id, and where the parameter enters the code/figures. Rows where
the vault does not confirm the repo’s attribution say so explicitly — see
Discrepancies below the table. Nothing in this file is cited from memory;
every link was read from a vault note. Where the vault has no source, the row
says assumption or not in vault instead of inventing one.
| # | Parameter | Value used | Source (as verified in vault) | Vault note | Used in |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Artists under 1,000 streams/yr (target T1) | 87% | Closest verified: Luminate year-end 2023 — 86.2% of tracks (not artists) ≤1,000 plays, via MBW 14 Mar 2024 (link); artist-side analogue: Chartmetric 2025 — 86% of Spotify artists <10 monthly listeners, via Kullick & Petry 2025 (PDF). See discrepancy D1. | deezer-has-deleted-26m-fake-artist-and-noise-tracks-since-it-launched-its-artist, a-r-t-i-c-l-e |
sim1 world construction, validation T1; fig2 |
| 2 | Rightsholders above $1,000/yr | 2.6% (259,700 of 10M+ uploaders, 2023) | Spotify Loud & Clear (2023 data), via Music Ally, 14 Jan 2025 (link) | chartmetric-tracks-11m-spotify-artists-fewer-than-16m-have-over-10-listeners-mus |
sim1 validation T2; CRITIC §5 bound (rightsholders, not artists) |
| 3 | Top share of streams (target T3) | top-0.28% ≈ 50%; Gini 0.72 | Òscar Celma, PhD thesis Music Recommendation and Discovery, UPF Barcelona (Last.fm crawl, July 2007: top-737 of 260,525 artists = 50% of playcounts) (PDF). Not a CMA number — CMA’s own: top-0.4% → 63–65% of streams 2014–2020 (final report). See D2. | music-recommendation-and-discovery, music-and-streaming, interim-report-c2-lfm-dataset-calibration-parameter |
sim1 validation T3 (world Gini validates at 0.97 by streams) |
| 4 | Plays per listener per artist | median 5.16, mean 21.21 | Schedl & Hauger, Int. J. Multimedia Information Retrieval 6:71–84, 2017, Table 6 (LFM-1b: 120,322 users, 1.09B events) (PDF); dataset intro: Schedl, ICMR 2016 (PDF). Measures panel lifetime, not a year → red team widened to 8–21 (CRITIC §2). | int-j-multimed-info-retr-2017-67184, the-lfm-1b-dataset-for |
every MVA number (PL=21.21 in all three sim1 scripts); fig1/5/7 |
| 5 | Pro-rata independent payout | $4.43 per 1,000 streams (US, Jan 2026) | Cited in PAPER §3 as Duetti; not in vault — no Duetti note exists, no public link verified here. See D3. | — | anchor of the independent pool; fig1/5/7, breakeven |
| 6 | Signed artist per-stream take | $0.0003/stream | Not in vault as a direct figure. Nearest independent points in vault: E&Y/SNEP 2015 waterfall via Techdirt (link); AEPO-ARTIS ≈£0.00065/stream (Sony data in CMA); CMA ≈£0.001/stream. See D3. | yes-major-record-labels-are-keeping-nearly-all-the-money-they-get-from-spotify-r, interim-report-per-fan-yield-for-the-mid-tail |
anchor of the signed pocket; 188,590; fig1/5/7 |
| 7 | Label pass-through | 6.772% — derived as 0.0003/0.00443, not an input (PAPER CHANGELOG v0.5.1) | Vault-independent corroboration of the order: 8–20% pass-through (Rose, Streaming in the Dark, Berkeley J. Ent. & Sports Law 13:1, May 2024, PDF); ~10.6% reaches recording artists (CMU via AEPO-ARTIS). The “~6.8% (CNM)” corroboration named in code comments is not in vault. See D4. | streaming-in-the-dark, spotifys-loud-but-not-so-clear-aepo-artis |
v05 matrix signed column; ×14.8 contract multiplier; fig7 |
| 8 | Superfan share of audience | 0.6–1.7% (sensitivity range; 1.7% base) | SoundCloud × MIDiA, Building a fan economy with Fan-Powered Royalties, July 2022 (118,000 artists: avg 1.5% of interactions → 29% of income; “typically 1–2%”; FPR winners 1.9% → 42%) (PDF). Lower bound 0.6% from the 97-2-1 participation rule (CRITIC §7), not from the white paper. See D5. | 1-building-a-fan-economy-with-fan-powered-royalties |
breakeven range (18 combinations); fig1, fig6 |
| 9 | Superfan revenue share (retraction input) | 29% of artist income | Same SoundCloud × MIDiA white paper — share of royalties under FPR, not donations; this category error is why “0.42 donations/yr” was retracted (CRITIC §1) | 1-building-a-fan-economy-with-fan-powered-royalties |
retracted P6 inversion; Retracted & bounded |
| 10 | Donation check | $3.1–6.9 (range; lognormal $5 base) | Range anchor: Waskow, Markett, Montag et al., Pay What You Want! A Pilot Study on Neural Correlates of Voluntary Payments for Music, Frontiers in Psychology 7:1023, 2016 — corrected mean PWYW €3.10, refusal 24.4% vs 17.3% (128/525 vs 91/525), N=25, real Bandcamp albums (link). The lognormal($5, σ=0.8) shape is an assumption, not measured (RESULTS, honest limitations). | pay-what-you-want-a-pilot-study-on-neural-correlates-of-voluntary-payments-for-m, interim-report-pwyw-conditions-and-power-law-reproduction |
direct-economy check; fig1/5/6/7, breakeven |
| 11 | Subscription price × pool share | $11.99/mo × 70% to the rights pool | 70%: “around 70%” per Bergantiños & Moreno-Ternero 2023 (citing Meyn et al. 2023) (PDF). $11.99 (US price) not in vault (vault holds UK £ tariffs from the CMA report). See D6. | arxiv231011861v1-econth-18-oct-2023 |
user-centric wallet model; fig1/5/7 |
| 12 | Twitch paying-fan cadence, sub price, split | k=12+ structural; $5/mo; 50/50 split | $5 monthly sub: Sjöblom & Hamari, Computers in Human Behavior 2017 (PDF); 50/50 split: only as the title of ref. 44 (Clancy 2022 letter) in the vault — percentages not in any note body. See D7. | full-length-article, vol0123456789-2 |
Twitch mechanics row (MVA 2,353); fig5/7; RESULTS §2 |
| 13 | Twitch income inequality | α=−2.13, Gini 0.57 (top-10k), ≈0.93 platform-wide | Houssard, Pilati, Tartari, Sacco & Gallotti, Monetization in online streaming platforms, Scientific Reports 13:1103 (2023) (PDF) | vol0123456789-2 |
RESULTS §2 benchmark context |
| 14 | Twitch motivation model | explains 3.7% of subscription variance; N=1,097 | Sjöblom & Hamari 2017 (same paper as #12) | full-length-article |
RESULTS §2 (why cadence, not motivation, is the dial) |
| 15 | Tencent gifting multiplier | ARPPU ¥175.1 vs ¥8.5 = 20.6× (4Q21); 6.4× after squeeze (4Q24); segment −66.3% over 3 yrs | TME 4Q/FY2021 results (link); TME 4Q/FY2024 results (link) | interim-report-tme-gifting-and-cis-willingness-to-pay, tencent-music-entertainment-group-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2021-un |
RESULTS §2 benchmark; PAPER §4 (regulatory risk in §9) |
| 16 | Patreon cadence and scale | k=12 (monthly billing arithmetic); ~25M paid vs ~100M free (Dec 2025) | Water & Music, Why superfan subscriptions are dying out, Dec 2025 (link). k=12 is billing arithmetic, not a vault number. | why-superfan-subscriptions-are-dying-out |
RESULTS §2 benchmark |
| 17 | Telegram Stars retention and payout | desktop 96.5% / mobile 67.5%; min withdrawal 1,000 Stars (~$13); 21-day hold | Withdrawal minimum 1,000 Stars: Telegram primary (stars_revenue_withdrawal_min in api/config, api/stars); retention and $-conversion: Tribute vendor guide 2026 (link) — vault holds ranges 95–97% / 65–70%; the point values 96.5/67.5 are midpoints. See D8. |
telegram-stars-guide-2026-earning-conversion-withdrawal, client-configuration, telegram-stars |
fig4 rails; $13 threshold logistics (Finding 4) |
| 18 | TON transaction fee | ~$0.0005 used in the model | Vault holds TON-denominated figures: ~0.00039 TON (ton.org marketing, link) and 0.000540370 TON measured (TON docs benchmark). The $ figure is a conversion, not a vault number — see D9. | ton-the-leading-l1-blockchain, wallets-performance-benchmark, interim-report-cost-model-architecture-mismatch |
fig4 rails (0.1¢ of $1) |
| 19 | Hamster Kombat collapse | ×25 in 6 months (300M → 12M), calibration anchor | 300M+ users and post-airdrop decline to 12M MAU: AInvest (link), CryptoPotato Sep 2024 (link). The “Caladan, Apr 2026” attribution (fig13 caption, SPEC) is not in vault. See D10. | telegrams-play-to-earn-ecosystem-as-a-high-growth-investment-opportunity-in-2025, hamster-kombat-announces-details-of-airdrop-23m-accounts-banned-for-cheating |
sim3 calibration T1; fig11–13 |
| 20 | Streaming fraud scale (context) | up to 85% of fully-AI-track streams fraudulent (2025); ~$2B/yr industry losses | Two sources, not one: 85% — Deezer Newsroom, 29 Jan 2026 (link, Jul 2026); $2B/yr — Beatdapp via MBW, 9 Jul 2024 (link). See D11. | how-to-detect-ai-music-deezer-sells-its-detection-tool, ai-music-tops-50-of-daily-uploads-on-deezer, streaming-fraud-costs-the-global-music-industry-2bn-a-year-according-to-beatdapp |
motivation for fig3 (the model’s dilution curve itself is analytic) |
| 21 | Payout-rule core theorem | any stable rule divides a listener’s fee only among artists that listener streamed | Bergantiños & Moreno-Ternero, Revenue sharing at music streaming platforms, arXiv:2310.11861 [econ.TH], Oct 2023 (PDF) — full text in vault | arxiv231011861v1-econth-18-oct-2023 |
PAPER §1 (World-A ceiling argument); README Related work |
| 22 | Bottom-tier market share | bottom two popularity categories ≈ 2% of market (2.2B remunerated streams) | Frederik Juul Jensen, PhD dissertation Alternative Payment Systems on Music Streaming Platforms, Université Sorbonne Paris Nord, defended 5 Sep 2025 (Deezer data: 160,747 users, 2018–2020, 3.3B → 2.2B streams) (PDF) | jensen-2025-phd-dissertation-alternative-payment-systems-on-music-streaming-plat |
sim1 validation (“bottom 90% hold 0.9%” cross-check) |
The table above records what the vault actually verifies. Where the repo’s running text attributes differently, the difference is listed here rather than silently harmonized — the same policy as Retracted & bounded.
Verified from the tonify-research vault (1,152 notes) on 2026-08-09; 132 search/note-show queries, nothing cited from memory.